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Abstract
The Convention on the Law of the Sea is the still controversial outcome of the
longest and perhaps most expensive international conference of the century.
The most debated issue at UNCLOS III was the Convention's regime to govern
seabed mining; differences of opinion on this regime have seriously challenged
the purpose of the Conference and are likely to keep the Convention from be-
coming effective as international law.
This paper is an inquiry into the economic causes for such an outcome. In
Section II the efficieny of the Convention's regulation for minerals production
from the ocean bed is analyzed. Section III deals with the efficiency of the
Convention's production process at UNCLOS, focusing on the determinants of
voting behaviour and on the rules of procedure used. The last section ex-
plores the rationale for alternative multilateral organizations for an efficient
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I. Introduction
After almost nine years of intensive negotiations among over a hundred coun-
tries, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was finally adop-
ted by majority vote in April 1982. The 130 votes in favour of the Convention
were subsequently endorsed by 117 signatures in December 1982. One year
later, however, the Convention had been ratified by only nine countries, i.
e., by 15 percent of the required number of countries. Today some countries
that formerly adhered to the Convention seem to have had second thoughts
and are in the process of joining the group of countries opposing it in their
demands for a review conference. Moreover, the latter nations are currently
considering the possibility of ocean use under a separate treaty, in case the
Convention is not revised according to their interests. What is the explanation
for such an outcome?
The most controversial issue at the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was the regime to govern seabed mining. This topic
had already been dealt with at the UN before, but was not placed on the
agenda of the Second UNCLOS, probably due to the fact that at that time
seabed mining was somewhat closer to the realm of science fiction than to
reality. Although it was still fairly futuristic when the recovery of manganese
nodules from the ocean bed began to be debated at UNCLOS III, it was appa-
rently spotted by the Group of 77 (nowadays counting 119 member countries)
as an ideal opportunity to introduce the principles of the so-called New Inter-
national Economic Order (NIEO) into modern maritime law.
Thus, in order to understand the outcome of UNCLOS III, the longest and
probably the most expensive international conference of the century, one
should approach the Convention from two different angles and try to find
answers to the following questions:
(a) What makes the Convention impossible to be accepted by all
UN countries?
(b) Whar specific characteristics of UNCLOS III are responsible
for the production of such an international public good?- 6 -
This paper shall attempt to answer these questions from an economic point of
view. In the next section the efficiency of the Convention's regime to govern
ocean mining is analyzed. Section III discusses the Convention's production
process at UNCLOS, focusing on two aspects, the composition of UNCLOS
participants and the decisionmaking procedures adopted at UNCLOS. Finally,
Section IV explores the rationale for an alternative legal-institutional regime
to govern deep-sea mining along the lines suggested by countries opposing
the Convention but lacking majority support at the UN.
II. The Convention: A Regime to Obstruct Seabed Mining
Whilst in the case of world fisheries the Convention on the Law of the Sea
provides a national solution favouring coastal states, the recovery of poly-
metallic nodules which were declared to belong to the "common heritage of
mankind" shall be controlled by an international bureaucratic body, the Sea-
bed Authority [UN, b]. This Authority will have the power to allocate seabed
mining licenses at discretion and to set production ceilings as well. Further,
it is entitled to collect revenue from ocean mining and to use its financial
resources for compensatory payments to developing land-based mineral pro-
ducers, in case their export earnings should be adversely affected by mine-
rals supply from the sea. In addition, the Seabed Authority will itself be
active in seabed mining through the "Enterprise". The latter will have the
advantage of receiving already prospected nodule fields and the relevant
technology on extremely soft terms from firms signing contracts with the Sea-
bed Authority.
Does such a regime offer the legal-institutional framework for an efficient sea-
bed mining? The answer is no. There are several reasons for this. The re-
covery of manganese nodules lying on the ocean bed at a depth of approxi-
mately 5000 meters is expected to call for first-generation investments in the
order of 1.5 billion US Dollars for each venture. Projects of such a magnitude
usually have a life of 20 to 25 years. Thus firms engaging in minerals pro-
duction from the deep sea ideally need a set of clearly defined, universal, ex-
clusive and transferable property rights [Posner, 1977]. This means that
they should embrace all the manganese nodules found on a delimited field- 7 -
(universality), that rights over a given field should be assigned only to one
firm or consortium (exclusivity), and finally that the firm holding these mine-
ral rights is given the possibility of selling them to other interested parties
(transferability).
The Convention's regime obviously does not meet such minimum conditions for
an efficient seabed mining, because the Seabed Authority is stipulated to as-
sign only a fraction of these rights to mining firms. Particularly, as has been
noted above, the Authority could interfere with the firm's production policy
by limiting its output. Also, contracts signed with the Seabed Authority are
not transferable, a fact that substantially increases the economic risk to be
borne by individual firms. Another feature that tends to obstruct the partici-
pation of international consortia in seabed mining by imposing prohibitive
costs upon them is the duty to hand over prospected fields to the Authority
and to virtually share R-and-D-intensive mining technology with competing
firms. Thus as it stands, the Convention is very likely to prevent seabed
mining from materializing mainly because it fails to offer the most basic
incentives for such an activity.
On a world scale, a regime that can be reasonably expected to deter poten-
tially interested firms could lead to a misallocation of resources in land-based
mining, thereby supplying consumers with dearer minerals from onshore sour-
ces instead of cheaper ones from the ocean. Furthermore, monopolistic compe-
tition prevailing on both the cobalt and nickel markets will continue to exploit
consumers and, in addition, constitutes a serious threat of cartelization. The
latter could be a reason for Western DCs to hold still higher strategic stock-
piles of such metals and, as a result, impose additional welfare costs on the
world economy.- 8 -
III. UNCLOS: The Trade-Off Between Democracy and Efficiency
The Convention's regime to govern deep-sea mining has been shown in the
last section to be an inefficient international public good. It is, therefore,
obvious, why the Convention could not be accepted by all countries partici-
pating at UNCLOS III, particularly by those holding substantial interests in
seabed mining . On the other hand, a paradox must still be resolved: Why
did the convention get 130 yes-votes, in spite of its economically unsound re-
gulation for ocean mining? To the extent that seabed mining was indeed the
crucial item determining individual countries' voting behaviour, such an out-
come may be primarily associated with (a) the specific composition of UNCLOS
participants and (b) the voting rule used.
1. Determinants of Voting Behaviour
UNCLOS participants can be classified according to their relative interest in
seabed mining as follows:
- pure consumer countries,
- land-based producers,
- ocean miners,
- countries engaged in both onshore and ocean mining, and
- other countries.
Countries belonging to the last group can be thought of as being very poor
and expecting almost no benefit at all from additional minerals supply. With
the exception of these poor countries, the rest of the world is likely to bene-
fit in the long run from the availability of cheaper minerals. In the short
run, however, adjustment on the supply side, i. e., among land-based pro-
ducers, could impose welfare losses on some land-based producers with com-
paratively low consumption of the affected minerals. Thus, such expected wel-
fare gains and losses can be plausibly assumed to have substantially influ-
enced the voting pattern at UNCLOS.
Only three Western countries with a stake in international seabed mining
consortia signed the Convention: Canada, France and Japaa. However,
neither of these countries has hitherto ratified it.- 9 -
Voting by countries indifferent to seabed mining is obviously dependent on
the benefits accruing to these countries from other parts of the Convention;
with the exception of land-locked countries, these countries could be safely
assumed to have voted in favour of the Convention. Land-based producers of
seabed minerals should have also voted for the Convention to the extent that
their expected losses in producer surplus are higher than their expected
gains in consumer surplus, if they can be expected to benefit from other
parts of the Convention. Countries active in both onshore and seabed mining
will accept the Convention if their expected gains in consumer surplus do not
exceed their losses in producer surplus from land-based production, assuming
they are in favour of the remaining parts of the Convention. Finally, pure
consumer countries can be predicted not to vote for the Convention on the
ground that an inefficient regime to govern seabed mining could prevent
ocean mining from materializing and, thus, impose losses in consumer surplus
on these countries which amount to their foregone (expected) gains from
cheaper minerals availability. Therefore, even if the latter countries benefit
from other parts of the Convention, they are aware that they could be much
better off with an efficient regulation of ocean mining.
It is of course not an easy task to empirically estimate the expected welfare
losses and gains from seabed mining. The main reason for this is that the
long-term supply and demand schedules for the relevant world mineral mar-
kets can hardly be approximated by econometric techniques. Thus, an assess-
ment of losses and gains for individual countries has to be carried out on the
basis of estimated decreases in production and consumption values following
simulated supply shocks from seabed mining . However, even then serious
data deficiencies in some cases and lack of data in other cases preclude a
thorough investigation for all countries concerned.
In Table 1 some estimates of potential net gains (losses) associated with sea-
bed mining are presented. The figures reveal that most major land-based pro-
ducers of seabed minerals will suffer net losses in the short run. This applies
to Australia, Canada, South Africa and to the COMECON-countries, as well as
to Zaire and Zambia, the two major producers among LDCs. In contrast, Ja-
pan, Western Europe and the United States, the :najor consumers and at the
1 On this see Foders [1984].- 10 -
Table 1 - Projected Distribution of Net Gains (+) and Losses (-)
from Deep-Sea Mining Under Open Access Among Selected
Countries





































a Computed as decrease in consumption value - decrease in value of
land-based production, with costs of seabed mining assumed to be
lower than onshore mining costs. Net gains (losses) were calculated
for the period 1988-1995, assuming that seabed mining begins hypothe-
tically 1988, and discounted to 1988 with a rate of 10 %.
Including New Caledonia.
Source: Foders [1984]- 11 -
same time potential ocean miners, enjoy net gains. From this one can infer
that, provided the benefits accruing to these countries from other parts of
the Convention are equally distributed among them, countries expecting net
losses should have accepted the Convention as it stands and that countries
expecting net gains should have opposed it.
Confronting this analysis with the actual voting behaviour of these countries
on April 30, 1982, when the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea was
voted upon (Table 2), yields some significant results: Voting by Australia,
Zaire, Zambia and other developing producers can be readily explained in
terms of the benefits they expect from seabed mining; the same applies to
Western Europe and the United States. Other countries can be plausibly as-
sumed to have voted either following political motives or expecting consider-
able benefits from other parts of the Convention. However, Japan offers an
interesting paradox: She voted in favour of the Convention although she was
shown (Table 1) to be the country expecting the highest net gains from sea-
bed mining.
Unfortunately, though, the votes apparently related to pure economic cost-
benefit thinking only amount to a subset of the 152 votes recorded on the
occasion under study. For most of the 116 'yes
1 votes from LDCs were not
submitted by land-based producers of seabed minerals. The bulk of LDCs
favouring the Convention seem to have done so either because they are
coastal states or because they belong to the Group of 77, or for both rea-
sons.
Membership in the Group of 77 can be expected to have had a significant in-
cidence in LDCs
1 voting behaviour due to the Group's commitment to establish
a New International Economic Order. Elements of this "new order" with conse-
quences for the international community are the proposal to introduce govern-
ment-like intervention on the international commodity markets like, for in-
stance, a common fund to finance buffer stocks and multilateral commodity
agreements. Their counterpart in maritime law is the Convention's regime to
govern seabed mining with its overprotection of land-based mineral producers



















































































Source: Voting results were taken from PlatzSder, Vitzthum [1984].- 13 -
Since the creation of the Group of 77 in the late sixties, international organ-
izations, notably the UN, can be observed to have repeatedly proposed pro-
grams for more dirigism in the international economy. An outstanding, well-
known example is the performance of UNCTAD, the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development. Consequently, one can not exclude the possibility
that LDCs which are non-members of the Group of 77 have nevertheless voted
for the Convention on the ground that they were influenced by the "Zeit-
geist" prevailing in such international conferences as UNCLOS.
2. Procedural Rules at UNCLOS
The overall importance of LDC votes . for the outcome of UNCLOS stems from
their number: Their 116 'yes' votes easily surpassed the two-thirds majority
(100 votes) needed. Even if all the countries interested in ocean mining would
have opposed the Convention, they could not have changed the outcome. A
basic question arises at this point: Was the voting rule used at UNCLOS ap-
propriate for an international conference aiming at a redistribution of ocean
wealth among the countries of the world? The answer is no. There are several
reasons for this.
The Convention on the Law of the Sea was adopted by a recorded vote strict-
ly following the rules of procedure agreed upon at the second session of
UNCLOS. In particular, events turned out to be an application of the "Gent-
leman's Agreement" which provided for voting if the Convention failed to
achieve unanimous acceptance . The allocation of votes was done in the
fashion of the UN's General Assembly, namely on a one-country-one-vote
basis.
The declaration incorporating the "Gentleman's Agreement" was approved
both by the UN General Assembly and by UNCLOS III [Platzoder, Vitzthum,
1984].
Consensus seems to have been emphasized at UNCLOS III because experi-
ence at the First and Second UNCLOS had shown that a two-thirds majority
could not be easily attained. On this see Sohn [1975], Ganz [1977] and
Barston [1983].
Unfortunately, though, voting was not practiced until the eleventh session,
after almost nine years of negotiations. For voting at some earlier session
could have revealed that consensus was an utopic goal impossible to be
achieved by such a heterogenous mix of participants even after a hundred
sessions. Logrolling or vote-trading is not very likely to have dramatically
footnote 3 continued p. 14- 14 -
Traditionally, multilateral organizations concerned with issues in international
law have either a purely recommendatory character or, alternatively, produce
enforceable rules supposed to be binding for member states . The United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development is an example of an organiza-
tion whose resolutions are nonbinding. The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
can be cited as an example for a task-oriented organization that takes deci-
sions directly binding on member countries. Interestingly, both organizations
have very different formal voting procedures. Whilst UNCTAD works with a
one-country, one-vote rule, the IMF makes use of a weighted voting system .
Further, at UNCTAD sessions agreement is achieved through majority voting
(simple or two-thirds majority), whereas at the Fund special majorities are re-
quired for decisionmaking.
To the degree that an organization producing enforceable norms binding on
member countries can be said to be more efficient than purely recommendatory
agencies, international decisionmaking faces the dilemma of having to choose
between (a) more democracy but less efficiency and (b) less democracy but
more efficiency. History shows that this election was not always decided by
the issues at stake, but at least there seems to have been a tendency in this
direction. In this respect, the tragedy of UNCLOS was that its agenda con-
tained both topics which should have been discussed in a task-oriented agen-
cy and topics that could be dealt with efficiently in a forum like UNCLOS. Sea-
bed mining should have been excluded from UNCLOS, whereas other fields of
maritime law widely established in international customary law and awaiting
continued footnote 3 from page 13
influenced the outcome, since general agreement on most of the other parts
of the Convention is a well-known fact. Only a few countries have openly
rejected the Convention on grounds unrelated to seabed mining: Israel,
Turkey and Venezuela voted against it, whereas Luxembourg, Spain and
Thailand abstained. Actually the parts of the Convention not refering to
seabed mining are generally acknowledged to codify current international
customary law.
Zamora [1980] distinguishes among three such decision levels. However, for
the argument developed in this paper the two extreme cases will suffice.
A detailed analysis of the IMF's weighted vo;ing system is offered by Gold
[1972, 1977].- 15 -
codification were efficiently handled at the Conference. Moreover, seabed
mining could be put high on the agenda of UNCLOS apparently because the
agenda was agreed upon by majority voting . Consequently, those countries
enjoying majority support at UNCLOS were able to determine the issues to be
discussed at later sessions.
Thus, majority voting at UNCLOS has failed to produce efficient decisions not
only on substantive matters but also on procedural items. This result clearly
reflects the hypotheses on majority voting put forward in the theoretical li-
terature which emphasize the shortcomings of majority voting in cases where
the degree to which voters are affected by their collective decisions is not
equally distributed among them. Applied to UNCLOS III one can conclude that
seabed mining has been dealt with under procedural structures which do not
correspond to the underlying economic realities of the countries concerned.
Seabed mining should have been on the agenda of a specialized agency
functioning very much like the IMF in formal procedural matters.
IV. Alternatives to the Convention: The Mini-Treaty Solution
The Convention on the Law of the Sea has been shown to offer an inefficient
legal-institutional framework for seabed mining. In the last section some hy-
potheses were presented in an attempt to explain inefficiencies in the produc-
tion process of such an international public good. One of the main conclusions
from the last two sections is that countries with an interest in seabed mining
have not been well served by collective action at UNCLOS. Their demands
concerning a sound international regime to govern ocean mining have been
virtually ignored. Thus these countries are presumably the big losers of
UNCLOS III.
In such a situation it is reasonable for the minority to consider the possibility
of creating alternative institutions in which the preferences of these countries
1 On this point see Eckert [1979].
See Tullock [1959], Buchanan and Tullock [1962] and Buchanan [1973].Table 3 - Estimated Benefits of Seabed Mining for Western Countries
Under Alternative Institutional Settings (millions of 1981 US-$)
Country/Region
Total Net Gains From Seabed Mining'
Mini-Treaty Solution UNCLOS Regime
Costs of Seabed Mining
Case A Case B Case A Case B
Output Level of Seabed Mining













































[decrease in consumption value - decrease in value of land-based production] - decrease in
value of seabed production (only case B of seabed mining costs). Net gains were computed for
the period 1988 - 1995 and discounted to 1988 with a rate of 10 percent.
Including payments to the Seabed Authority, i. e. fixed fees and royalties as stipulated in
the Convention. Figures in parenthesis are foregone gains (-) and saved losses (+).
Case A: first generation costs of seabed mining are constant and in line with prices prevailing
after the supply shock from the ocean.
Case B: first generation costs of seabed mining are constant and in line with base-case prices.
Low: 5 mill, tons of manganese nodules p. a.; High: 15 mill, tons of manganese nodules p. a.
Belgium, France, Germany (F. R. of), Italy, Netherlands, United Kingdom.
Source: Foders [1984].Table 4 Contribution to United Nations Budget of Western Countries Interested














































































































































Source: UN [a].- 18 -
can be adequately represented . The problem of optimizing a country's parti-
cipation in international organizations according to the costs and benefits in-
volved is, of course, not new, and has also been addressed in the theoretical
2
literature .
In the case studied in this paper, a quantitative assessment of costs and
benefits associated with alternative organizations is extremely difficult, due to
the fact that these alternatives lack historical data. Nonetheless, it should be
useful to compare (a) the net losses incurred by potential ocean miners if
they would accept the Convention with (b) the net gains these countries
could enjoy if they would join a separate club (Mini-Treaty Solution) and en-
gage in seabed mining virtually like under a regime of open access.
Table 3 presents estimates of the net gains (losses) accruing to countries po-
tentially active in ocean mining under different institutional settings, cost
scenarios and output levels. These figures have been computed under the as-
sumption that the Mini-Treaty Solution does not entail royalty payments or
other payments to a central authority. Subject to the limitations of such cal-
culations one can conclude that Japan, Western Europe and the United States
would be clearly much better off under the Mini-Treaty Solution than under the
Convention. This applies to both a scenario with and to a scenario without
seabed mining under the Convention. In the latter case the net gains that
would be possible under the high-output scenario of the separate-club solu-
tion would turn out to be losses in the sense of foregone gains, if the Seabed
Authority should deter mining firms from engaging in seabed mining or, alter-
natively, set zero production ceilings. Then, only Canada would enjoy gains
in the sense of saved losses.
Consequently, it can be said to be rational and Pareto-efficient for countries
potentially active in ocean mining to join a separate club among few, homo-
geneous parties with low expected transaction costs. In fact, considering that
the Seabed Authority envisaged in the Convention could render seabed mining
totally unprofitable, the Mini Treaty-Solution seems to be the only viable
alternative for ocean mining to materialize.
See, for example, the "Agreement Concerning Interim Arrangements Relating
to Polymetallic Nodules of the Deep Sea Bed" signed by Germany (F. R.
of), France, the United Kingdom and the United States in 1982.
See especially Buchanan [1968] and Olson and Zeckhauser [1968].- 19 -
Another paradox of UNCLOS III is that the countries financing over 50 % of
the costs incurred by the Conference during its nine-year life (Table 4) have
been left with the need to consider new forms of organization for seabed
mining; they cannot realistically be expected to either entirely waste the re-
sources already invested in this sector of the world economy or to ignore the
vast economic rent associated with the recovery of polymetallic nodules from
the seabed.
V. Concluding Remarks
UNCLOS III has been a marathon conference dealing with a redistribution of
ocean wealth. The legal framework for this redistribution of future income
flows from ocean use was expected to be adopted by consensus by all partici-
pants. Unfortunately, although the bulk of the issues included in the Con-
vention can be safely said to be supported by almost every country in the
world, differences of opinion on only one issue, namely the regime to govern
deep-sea mining, were capable to seriously challenge the significance of the
whole Convention and obliged the Conference to finally resort to majority
voting in order to prevent it from continuing indefinitely.
This outcome seems to have been determined by the particular mix of topics
placed on the Conference's agenda and by the procedural rules used. The
principal shortcoming of these structures was that they did not appropriately
reflect economic realities. What can we learn from this? One lesson from
UNCLOS III is to realize that future conferences on, say, the use of Antarc-
tica or outer space should not be carried out in the fashion of UNCLOS, due
to the unequal distribution of the substantial interests involved among the
countries of the world. Another lesson from UNCLOS III is that countries
should be aware of the costs and benefits likely to be associated with collec-
tive actions. Further, expected costs and benefits as well as the underlying
preferences of countries may change in time. Therefore, the decision to join a
given organization at one point in time should be periodically revised
according to actual developments. A recent example can be cited to illustrate
this: The United States seriously questioned her membership in the United- 20 -
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) on the
grounds that she provided an important share of UNESCO's funds but disap-
proved of their allocation. Also other European countries, particularly the
United Kingdom, have threatened to also evalue their net benefits from
UNESCO in a new spirit.- 21 -
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